

C e r t i f i c a t e

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed original document entitled:

Statement of A.F.P. HULSEWÉ, Lieut. P.N.N.R., dated Batavia, June 22, 1946, concerning the BANDOENG-ultimatum, has been taken from the official records of the NEFIS.

Signature:

C. JONGENEEL

(SEAL) - NEFIS

Batavia, June 25th, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me K.A. DE WEERD, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.I.A., Senior Official attached to the office of the Attorney-General N.E.I.

(signed) K. A. de Weerd

S t a t e m e n t

of A.F.P. Hulsewé, Lieutenant, Royal Netherlands Navy Reserve, special service branch:

The witness duly sworn states:

My name is Anthony Francois Paulus HULSEWÉ, I am Netherlander by nationality. I am 36 years of age; my permanent home is Batavia, where I am living at present.

My civil occupation before having been inducted into military service, was staff member of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs (Japanese section) of the N.E.I. Government, currently lecturer-extraordinary in Chinese and cultural history

of the Far East. Dates of appointment: 1922 language student at Leyden University, Holland, 1931 language student in China and Japan, 1935 staff member, 1940 reader in cultural history, 1941 lecturer-extraordinary.

On February 22, 1942, as a naval ratings, second reserve, untrained, I was called up for service with the Royal Navy, with orders to report to the Navy Department at Bandoeng. I reported there on 23 February and was attached to a section of the War Office, under the direct orders of Commander L. Brouwer, R.N. (at present in Tokyo, Japan). On 2 March I was commissioned as sub-lieutenant, Royal Naval Reserve, Special Service Branch.

On 6th March at approx. 22.00 hrs. I was summoned by my colleague of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs, H. HAGENAR (at present in Holland) to attach myself immediately to the suite of His Excellency the Governor General of the N.E.I., where I duly reported. The next morning I informed the War Office.

On 7th March at approx. 15.30 hrs. the Governor General and his suite moved from the Resident's house to a villa on a hillside on the outskirts of Bandoeng, after a Japanese bombing attack, during which bombs had fallen on all sides of the Resident's house.

During the early part of the morning of 8 March there were several Japanese planes continuously over Bandoeng. Because of the danger of air attack - I do not remember whether any bombs were actually dropped; in any case not in our vicinity - the Governor General and most of his suite (I amongst them) were in the very large and commodious airraid shelter built deep into the hillside. The shelter was connected by telephone. I presume at that time I must have learned that during the night talks had been started between the Netherlands Indies forces holding Bandoeng and the Japanese, who had broken through at Lembang; these talks were at that moment proceeding at Villa Isola, on the road to Lembang. Shortly before 10.00 hrs the Governor General was required on the telephone and from his remarks we understood that his presence had been demanded by the Japanese at the abovementioned talks. The Governor General refused, stating that his presence was definitely not needed in talks concerning the surrender of a single locality such as the Bandoeng area. Soon afterwards the Governor General was again wanted on the telephone and this time he was informed

that the Japanese absolutely demanded his presence, at Soebang however, and that unless he complied with this demand immediately Bandoeng town was to be bombed. Under these circumstances the Governor General felt that he could not but give in. - (I heard later from somebody who had been present at Villa Isola, that as soon as the Governor General's consent had become known there a Japanese officer who had shown signs of great nervousness, rushed to the wide lawn and laid out a signal sheet pattern, ordering the Japanese bombers not to attack).

The Governor General left the villa immediately afterwards. He was accompanied by his two aides Lieut. Col. L. LANZING R.N. I.A., and Lt. Commander H. Baron VAN TILL, R.N., the Secretary General KIVERON, the Chef de Cabinet Dr. F. IDENBURG, the staff-member of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affairs H. HAGENNAAR, and myself. We were joined - I presume right at the villa - by the C-in-C Royal N.E.I. Army, Lieut. Gen. H. TER POORTEN and his suite in several motorcars, the General's car driving in front and carrying the white flag. At Villa Isola two cars with Japanese military joined us. After a difficult trip we arrived at Soebang.

At Soebang we waited for some time in the cars, to be told eventually that the Governor General was expected at the airfield Kali Djati, so we went there.

At Kali Djati our party were made to wait in the airfield's sergeants' mess, where we were joined by a number of Japanese officers, amongst them the G.O.C. Airforces, who made a fiery speech commemorating Japan's victory. After considerable time, two hours at least, the Governor General was asked to choose a small number of people to accompany him at the coming talks, as there would not be sufficient space to accommodate the whole N.E.I. party. Eventually we proceeded to a married officers' quarters close by.

The talks were held in the dining room; the front room was filled with newspaper reporters and moving picture people and the communicating double doors were wide open. The Governor General sat facing Lieut. Gen. IMAMURA; at his right hand Lt. Gen. TER POORTEN, I do not remember the seating of Maj. Gen. BAKKERS (Chief of Staff) and Maj. Gen. PESMAN (G.O.C. Bandoeng area). Behind the chairs Messrs. Kiveron, Idenburg and myself - possibly also Mr. Hagenaar, were left standing. On Lt. Gen. IMAMURA's right was his Chief of Staff, on his left the G.O.C. Airforces. Behind their chairs there stood a considerable number of Japanese officers, at least twenty.

The talks must have started about 16.30 hrs. I have no clear recollection of the exact sequence of the questions and answers, nor of course of their complete contents. However, this was my first attempt at interpreting and I found it uncommonly difficult, particularly as Lt. Gen. INAHURA persisted in quoting a draft, written in the usual high flown style, more easily read than understood. The result was that after about ten minutes I was floundering so badly that a Japanese left the ranks behind the General's chairs and offered to take over and was permitted to do so; he was T. MIYOSHI, formerly of the Japanese Consulate General at Batavia.

The first question was, whether the Governor General as C-in-C of the N.E.I. sea, land and air forces had come to submit the surrender of these forces. The answer took some time, as it gave rise to several new questions. The short of it was: no, he had come because he had been summoned to be present at talks concerning the surrender of Bandoeng, with the threat that this town was to be destroyed by aerial bombing in case he did not appear. Furthermore he was unable - willingness apart - to hand in any surrender terms, as his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief of the N.E.I. Forces had been expressly cancelled by the Netherlands Government a few days previously. The reply to these statements was, that the Japanese were not going to let themselves be tricked by a piece of political skull-duggery and that in their eyes the Governor General still was the C-in-C of the N.E.I. Forces.

The next point was: surrender of the N.E.I. Forces. The Governor General maintained that he had been summoned in connection with the surrender of Bandoeng only. This question was entered into at some length. The Japanese made two points: 1. Bandoeng was only of small importance, it was theirs for the taking, as the outer defences had already been smashed; two or three days more would see them in the town. 2. The G.O.C. Airforces insisted that the surrender of Bandoeng - town or area - would be useless, as air reconnaissance had shown considerable bodies of N.E.I. troops withdrawing into the difficult mountain area around the Bandoeng plateau.

The upshot of these discussions was the renewed demand of the Japanese C-in-C that the Governor General tender the unconditional surrender of all N.E.I. forces, the demand now accompanied by the threat that unless he complied, Bandoeng was to be bombed flat.

After some more talk the unconditional surrender was agreed to, with two or three days grace for troops in outlying areas. The whole proceedings were verbal; I do not remember the Governor General signing any document.

At this stage the Governor General and his personal suite - i.e. Messrs. KIVERON and IDENBURG (RAGENAAR?) and I - were told to leave the room and wait outside; purely military matters were going to be arranged with the generals alone.

After about three quarters of an hour's waiting under the eaves of the house in the drizzling rain, we left together for the sergeants' mess and immediately afterwards for Bandoeng, accompanied by a truck with Japanese engineers to help us across the difficult patches in the road. We arrived back in Bandoeng at approx. 00.30 hrs, March 9, 1942.

Signature: A. F. P. HULSEWÉ

Sworn and subscribed before me K.A. de Weerd, LL.D., first lieutenant R.N.I.A., senior official attached to the Office of the Attorney General N.E.I. this 22nd day of June, 1946.

Signature: K. A. de Weerd

證明

Doc 2622A

左記署名者蘭印陸軍中尉「エールス・ヨングネール」和蘭軍情報部戰
犯課長、宣誓と此處添付、原本書類即「バタビヤ」一九四六年昭和二十年
六月三日附「バント」に最後通牒ニ関スル和蘭預備海軍大尉「エーニア・
ヘルリ」陳述書ハ和蘭軍情報部、公式記録中ヨリ採録せられたルコ
トヲ證明ス。

「バタビヤ」一九四六年昭和二十年六月三日
エールス・ヨングネール署名



本書、蘭領東印度總督事務所所屬先任官吏蘭印陸軍中尉
名抵者「ケー・エー・ド・ワイルド」法学博士、面所ニ於テ署名宣誓スヲナリ。

ケー・エー・ド・ワイルド署名

本書、和蘭預備海軍特種勤務部「エーニア・ヘルリ」大尉供述書ニシテ
本證ハ宣誓ト左ノ通り陳述ス。

和姓名「エーニア・フランク・ボリス・ヘルリ」ト申シ、籍ハ和蘭人ナル本年
三十一。本籍地「バタビヤ」デレンニ自今、現在居住スナル。

軍務ニ服スル前職業、蘭印政府、東亞會(日本課)、課員兼支那語並ニ東亞
文化特別講師ナリ。略歴、一九二八年和蘭、ライデン大学、語学ニ生。

一九三二年支那及日本於テ語学ニ生。一九三五年課員、一九四〇年文化講師
一九四二年特別講師トナリ。

一九四三年二月三日海軍省ニ預備米教練水兵トシテ和蘭海軍ニ召集サレバント
シ海軍省出頭ヲ命ゼラレタ。二月三日出頭シ陸軍省、課ニ配屬サレタ。

海軍中佐「エー・ブローワー」直接指揮ト入リ。同人、現在日本、東京ニ居ル。
三月三日附ニ海軍預備特種勤務部、海軍中尉ニ任命サレタ。

Doc 1342

261

Doc 2622A

次者ハキリト、思出サシ、從テ勿論其金ハ内各付テモ思出セリ。
然レテカウエトハ私、初メテ通譯テアリ並ニテハ難儀コトナク。殊ニ今
村中將ハ通例、高尚ケ文字体ニ書カシ、意味ヲ解セルヨリ元々ニ讀ムコト、
方ガ容易ナキ事ヲ引用シテ言ハ張ルモノ困難ナキ事。其ノ結果約十
分後私非常ニモシキ出シテ、將官ハ其後ニ陸多隊列ノ中ヨリ一人自本人
ガ出テ来テ私ニ代リテヤルト申出デシハ許可サシ。其ノ人ハ以前
「ハタヤ」日本総領事館ニ居タルエー・ニ好氏ナリ。

(次頁ニ續ク)

264

Doc 2622A

第一問題、蘭領東印度、海陸空軍、司令長官トシテ總督、
之等三軍、降伏ヲ申達スルニ至リシヤ否ヤト云フデアル。之ニ對スル
返答ハ之ニ關聯シテ幾多、新シイ問題ヲ出シ来ルヲ暫ク時間ガ
カッタ。返答ヲ要約スバ——否——彼が生キ来タハ一彼が去
テ来タレバ空爆ニ依ツテ此町ヲ潰滅スルト威嚇シテ彼ヲ「ハント」
降伏ニ固スル會談ヘ呼ビ出シタラザアル。更ニ意思、有無ハ別トシ
彼、蘭領東印度軍、總司令官トシテ、憲法上、權限ハ二三日
以前ニ和蘭政府ニ依リ明白ニ解消サレタガ彼、如何ナル降伏條
件モ提役スルトハ出来ナク、此、陳述ニ對スル日本側、返事ハ
日本側ハカナル一歩、政治的詐術ニ依リテ瞞着サルモノニアラズ、彼
等、目ウラハ總督ハ今モ尚ホ蘭領東印度軍、總司令長官ナリ
ト見ラオルト云フニ在リタ。

次、点ハ全蘭領東印度軍、降伏問題デアル。總督ハ自
分、軍ニ「ハント」シ、降伏問題ニ關シテハ、カハ喚サタデアルト主
張シタ。此問題ハ相当長イ時間ヲ要シタ。日本側デハ二ツノ點
ヲ主張シタ。(一)「ハント」シ、重要性ハ徹々タルモノニ過キズ。既ニ
外部、防禦陣地ハ破砕サレキナルガタラ「ハント」シ、日本側、
常中ニアルモノデ、モウアト二、三日スバ同町内ニ日本軍ヲ
見セデラフ。(二)飛行隊司令官ハ「ハント」シ、町スハ地方モ
「降伏」ハモウ問題デハナ。何トナレバ空ヲテ偵察ニ依リテ相生タ
ク、蘭領東印度部隊ガ「ハント」シ高地、周圍ニ在ル險阻ヶ小岳
地帯ヘ退却シタルトガ判明シ居ルモノト主張シタ。

705

是等討議、結果ハ日本軍司令官、總督、全蘭領東
印度軍、無條件降伏ヲナス可シト云フ新規要求トナリタ。

Doc 2622A

五、彼之應セサルニ於テハ「バート」ハ斷然爆發ナル可シト威嚇ガ
件セタ

尚ホ暫ク討議ヲ重ネタル末 外部ハ外部諸地方ニ在ル部隊
ノタニニ三日猶餘付ヲ以テ無條件降伏ガ承諾ヲ得本會議全
部口頭ノミデサケル。總督ガ何レカ書類ニ署名セラルヤ否ヤ私ハ
記憶ニテ居ナイ。

此ノ段階ニ於テ總督ト其ノ隨員即チ「モリス」氏「
デブルグ」氏（「ハーゲナール」氏）及私——ハ部屋ヲ出テ室外
テ待ツヤウ告ゲレタ。然ル軍事上ノ事項ハ將官ノミノ間テ処
理サレントシクノデアル。

雷雨ガ降ルテ居タ軒下テ約半五分モ待ツタ後 吾々ハ一諸
ニ出カケテ軍曹集合所ノ方ヘ行キ間モ「バート」ヘ向ケルガ
日本人技士ノ乗ツテオル貨物自動車ガ同行シテ道路上ノ困難
ナ箇所ヲ通ル時 吾々ヲ援ケテ呉レタ。

吾々ハ一九四二年／昭和十七年三月九日午前零時三十一分頃「バート」
ニ（帰）着レタ。

エー・エフ・ロー「ヘルシー」署知
右一九四六年／昭和二十一年六月二十二日 蘭領東印度檢
事總長事務所所屬、先任官吏タル法字博士蘭印陸軍
中尉「ケー・エー・ト・ウキールド」ノ面前ニ於テ宣誓ノ上記
述セモノナリ。

ケー・エー・ト・ウキールド署名